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Collective Investments for Pension Saving:
Lessons from Singapore’s Central Provident Fund Scheme
Benedict S. Koh, Olivia S. Mitchell and Joelle HY. Fong
In a defined contribution (DC) system, participants bear the responsibility to amass
sufficient wealth to finance their own retirement consumption. This paper explores how one of
Asia’s foremost retirement programs, Singapore’s national mandatory Central Provident Fund
(CPF) scheme, has approached investment choice for its participants in an effort to grow
retirement wealth. Since 1986, the CPF has allowed savers to divert a portion of assets from
their CPF accounts into individually-managed investment funds. Included in the list of
permissible investment products are unit trusts (mutual funds) and investment-linked insurance
products (ILPs) offered by private-sector professional fund managers. Prior research has shown
that only 12 percent of investible funds, however, have been delegated to professional money
managers (Koh et al. 2007)1. This paper asks whether the investment choices that workers could
have selected as an alternative to leaving their savings in CPF accounts earning default interest
rates do actually offer an advantageous instrument in growing employee savings. We also
examine whether these funds help participants effectively diversify market risk.
This question is of interest for three reasons. First, a growing body of research has raised
concern about how ready workers are to handle their own pension investment decisions,
providing evidence of investment inertia, naive portfolio diversification, excessive reliance on
conservative investment options, and financial illiteracy regarding basic investment concepts
(Mitchell et al. 2007)2. This raises a question as to how much investment choice is actually
beneficial in the context of retirement saving plans. Second, the recent investment record of
participants that have used the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) in Singapore has been
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discouraging. Whether this poor investment record might be due to the dismal performance of
the financial markets or poor portfolio choice by individual participants, or both, is an empirical
question. Third, in the last decade, CPF monies have been flowing rapidly out of CPF accounts
into the unit trust industry. For example in 1997, CPF-included funds constituted just 16 percent
(or $0.5 billion) of the unit trust industry’s assets under management; by 2007, this had risen to
67 percent (or $26 billion)3. Accordingly, a large and rising fraction of workers’ retirement
funds are in the hands of professional fund management companies, which makes it particularly
important to investigate how they perform and whether they are effective in growing savings.
In what follows, we first survey the literature on the performance of professionallymanaged funds. Next, we briefly describe the structure of Singapore's CPF Investment Scheme
and explain the role of unit trusts in the asset mix. This is followed by an analysis of the
aggregate performance of unit trusts offered under the investment scheme for various holding
periods. Subsequently, we investigate the return and risk profiles of the unit trusts and ascertain
whether these funds seem to be well-positioned in conformity with their prospectuses. We also
examine whether the unit trusts are sufficiently diversified and whether the fund managers
exhibit superior stock selection and market timing skills. Last, we assess whether unit trusts
show persistence in their performance.

Prior Studies
Most of the empirical literature on retail mutual fund manager performance has relied on
U.S. data, where the broad consensus is that managers responsible for such funds tend to
underperform their benchmark portfolios. Early studies on US mutual funds by Jensen (1968)
and Sharpe (1966)4 showed that fund managers did not exhibit superior stock selection skills.
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More recent work corroborates this finding (Malkiel, 1995; Gruber, 1996)5. While mutual funds
do not generate positive alphas, some analysts find evidence of persistence in mutual fund
performance over shorter horizons of up to five years (Grinblatt and Titman 1992; Hendricks et
al. 1993)6. Yet additional investigation by Malkiel (1995) noted that much of the evidence of
persistency in performance was restricted to the 1970s and it disappeared in the 1980s. Carhart
(1997)7 further found that persistency in mutual fund performance can be explained by common
factors in stock returns and investment expenses. In general, then, there is little convincing
evidence of abnormal positive performance by U.S. professional fund managers.
Empirical evidence on U.S. fund manager market timing skills tends to be more mixed.
For instance, some authors uncover no evidence of fund manager market timing skills,8 while
others do offer support for timing skill in the average performance of mutual funds.9 Analysts
who take into consideration the substantial evidence of non-stationary systematic risk levels in
portfolios that consequently affect mutual fund performance tend to confirm the existence of
significant timing in fund manager ability.10
In the Singapore context, Tse and Chia (1997)11 analyzed the performance of 36 equity
unit trusts (including those outside of CPFIS) for 1990-99. The chosen funds concentrated their
investment in stocks traded in Singapore and the Asian region. The authors concluded that fund
managers performed poorly in security analysis and market timing, and they found no
consistency in fund performance ranking. On the other hand, they showed that the unit trusts
were well diversified and performed fairly well in terms of risk-adjusted returns, especially when
compared to the risk-free rate. A more recent study by Chia, Chua and Tsui (2007)12 measured
unit trusts’ 1992-2006 performance using a sample of 87 unit trusts which represented about a
third of the entire CPFIS-included universe of unit trusts (231). That study included only equity-
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based funds with a track record of more than 3 years, and the authors report mixed evidence of
stock picking skills by fund managers and no evidence of market timing. They also confirmed
that the performance of fund managers was not consistent over time.
The present paper develops a more comprehensive analysis of the risk-return
characteristics of unit trusts included in the list of investment funds available to savers in the
CPF (as of December 2007). We do so with the help of an exclusive dataset obtained from
Morningstar Research Private Limited (“Morningstar”).13 Using this rich dataset, we evaluate the
unit trust performance for a wider range of fund types than previous studies. Rather than
concentrating exclusively on equity-based funds, here we review equity funds, balanced funds,
and income funds in which CPF members might potentially invest, which provides a uniquely
useful comparison of performance measures across major fund types in the unit trust industry. In
so doing, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of all unit trusts included in the CPFIS list.

The Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme
The Central Provident Fund in Singapore was first established in 1955 as a mandatory
savings program.14 Half a century later, the CPF has evolved into a wide-ranging social security
system covering 3.2 million CPF members, of whom 1.58 million are active as of June 2008.15
Since its inception, the CPF has been a defined contribution plan financed by mandatory levies
on employees’ total monthly earnings up to an earnings cap. Contribution rates and caps have
varied over time with current rates amounting to between 8.5 to 34.5 percent of salary depending
on the employee’s age, and the monthly salary ceiling is set at S$4,500 (approximately
US$3,333).16
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The Default CPF Fund
When the Singaporean scheme was first established, the CPF Board requires members to leave
their retirement savings in CPF accounts. These accounts pay a risk-free rate of return which as
of mid-2008 was 2.5 and 4 percent respectively on CPF Ordinary Account balances (CPF-OA)
and Special Account (CPF-SA) balances. The stipulated 2.5 percent is, in fact, a floor, since the
actual interest rate is the higher of 2.5 percent or a “market-related interest rate” based on the
weighted average of the 12-month fixed deposit rates (80%) and the month-end saving rates
(20%) of the major local banks over the preceding 3 months. In this way, the Board guarantees a
safe minimum nominal return, while offering participants the possibility of upside potential
should market rates rise. From January 1, 2008 the CPF-SA rate is pegged to the 12-month
average yield of the 10-year Singapore Government Security (10YSGS) plus 1%.17
The CPF-OA and SA rates represent rather attractive risk-free rates of return, compared
to the ‘proxy risk-free rate’ of about 0.25 percent (in May 2008) set by the Monetary Authority
of Singapore. To help CPF members further improve returns on their retirement saving, the
government has recently announced it will pay an additional bonus of 1 percent per annum on
the first $60,000 of a member’s combined OA and SA balances (as of June 2008). In addition,
the interest rate for funds held in the Special Medisave Retirement Account (SMRA) is to be repegged to the 10-year Singapore Government Security (10YSGS) yield plus 1 percent. Had this
new SMRA formula been in place since the first issue of 10Y SGS, the SMRA rate would have
averaged 4.5 percent (MOM, 2008). The latter change may have an important impact on CPF
members, since the attractive default rate of return combined with the 2.5 percent rate floor is
likely to encourage members to leave their savings in CPF accounts and induce yet more inertia.
On the other hand, if the floating SMRA rate18 were to fall, participants will need to be more
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nimble in deploying their SA balances out of their CPF accounts into alternative investment
opportunities.

General Structure of the CPFIS
The CPF Investment Scheme has provided members with access to investment alternatives since
1986. Early on, CPFIS participants were permitted to invest only a portion of their OA and SA
saving in the included set of instruments. However, from 2001, the portion was raised to 100
percent for both the OA and SA.19 Clearly, this provides participants much latitude and
discretion in terms of creating and determining their own retirement asset portfolio20.
The range of products in which CPF members may invest their mandatory contributions
is diverse. In 2008, for instance, CPF-OA funds could be invested in fixed deposits, Treasury
bills, corporate bonds, property funds, equities traded on the Singapore stock exchange, bonds
guaranteed by the Singapore government, annuities and endowments, ILPs, unit trusts, exchange
traded funds (ETFs), fund management accounts, and gold. As CPF-SA balances are intended to
be earmarked for old age, a slightly narrower set of investment products has been allowed for SA
monies. It must be noted that the CPF Board does not endorse any product included on the
CPFIS list though these instruments may be selected by members for investment.
With such a rich offering of investment options, it is of interest to examine whether
CPFIS investors have been successful in growing their retirement saving. The recent evidence is
not comforting: for instance, almost half of CPFIS Ordinary Account investors incurred
investment losses in FY 2004–07, while one-third realized profits equal to or less than the default
rate of 2.5 percent earned by those who left their saving in CPF accounts (see Table 1). Only
one-fifth of the investors made net realized profits in excess of the OA interest rate. This poor
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investment performance has not gone unnoticed by policymakers, who point to high investment
fees and expenses as one of the explanation for low returns21.
Table 1 here
Growth of Unit Trusts under the CPFIS
With such dismal investment performance, CPF members have progressively turned to
professional fund managers to help manage their money, particularly unit trusts. A unit trust is
similar to a US mutual fund, in that it is an investment vehicle which pools money from numerous
investors to invest in a portfolio of securities such as shares, bonds, and deposits. Investors find unit
trusts attractive because they offer them the benefits of diversification, liquidity as well as access
to the services of professional fund managers.
Total assets held by Singapore-based money managers reached S$1.2 trillion in 2007
(approximately US$814 billion), of which S$39 billion pertained to Collective Investment
Schemes (CIS) which include equity funds, bond funds, balance funds, money market funds, and
capital guaranteed/protected funds. There were a total of 349 of these CIS in 2007, of which 162
are included under the CPFIS.22 CPF-included CIS constituted only 18 percent of all CIS in 1997,
but by 2007, this jumped to 46 percent.

Empirical Approach
To investigate the performance of CPFIS included unit trusts, we rely on a time series of
returns earned by funds with a track record of at least 10 years for two sample periods ending
December 2001 and December 2007. These two end dates are specifically chosen to coincide with
the bear and bull phases of the stock market cycle. In addition, we compare the performance of
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funds over five and 10 years, which we take to represent moderate and longer-term holding
periods.
Our dataset was obtained from Morningstar Asia which provides monthly price
observations at month-end for the Singaporean financial market. The observations utilize a
reinvested income price series which assume that dividend distributions are reinvested.23 These
fund returns are then compared to the individual funds’ benchmark returns specified by the
investment management companies as well as the three-month Treasury bill rate and the CPFOA rate (CPF default interest rate).

Aggregate Performance of CPFIS Unit Trusts
When unit trusts are sold by fund managers to the public, they often emphasize that such
investments should be held over a relatively long investment horizon. This is because the
performance of unit trusts fluctuates in tandem with the stock market and hence there is no
guarantee that investors will not suffer losses in the short run. However, as fluctuations in asset
prices tend to tamper off in the long run, investors can expect these funds to achieve positive capital
appreciation over longer horizons.
To test this hypothesis, we compare the performance of unit trusts against three yardsticks:
three-month T-bill rate, the CPF-OA rate, and the fund’s own benchmark index return. The CPFOA rate is a sensible yardstick because an alternative to moving one’s CPF savings into the capital
market directly would be to simply do nothing, leaving the money in the CPF OA account to earn
the default return. Naturally, stock markets cycles mean that realized returns are volatile, but it is
reasonable to expect unit trusts to outperform the risk-free rate as well as the CPF default interest
rate in the long run.
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Table 2 provides summary statistics which show that Singapore’s unit trusts generally
performed better over the long term than in the short term. Majority of unit trusts evaluated
reported positive returns which are higher than the CPF default interest rate and the risk-free rate for
most sample periods except for the 5-year holding period ending 12/01. The latter period coincided
with the dotcom crash. Unlike hedge funds, unit trusts cannot exploit a market downturn by shortselling securities. Consequently, in a falling market, they can only mitigate their performance
partially by underweighting stocks and overweighting bonds and deposits to minimize losses.
Table 2 here
The average returns of CPFIS unit trusts range from 1.98 % to 16.32 % per annum for the
five-year holding period, and from 7.96 % to 10.27 % per annum for the 10-year holding period.
Returns earned by these unit trusts are highly correlated with the performance of the stock market as
a whole. For the period ending December 2001, returns were generally lower, coinciding with the
dotcom crash. After 2002, the Singaporean stock market staged a recovery and unit trusts’
performance rose correspondingly. In particular, the 16.32 % annualized average return earned by
unit trusts for the five-year period ending December 2007 coincided with the worldwide stock
market boom. While most unit trusts reported positive returns for all holding periods, a significant
percentage of unit trusts underperformed the CPF default rate. Consistent with empirical studies
from other countries, we also notice a high percentage of funds failing to beat their benchmarks in
terms of average return. For instance, over the five-year holding period, only 39.5 % earned more
than their benchmarks, a statistic that rises to 64.6 % for the 10-year holding period. The
performance of unit trusts is much better for the sample period ending December 2001, where 80-88
percent outperformed the benchmark indices.
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Risk-Return Characteristics of Unit Trusts
Investors select unit trusts based on the descriptions provided in fund prospectus, where UTs are
broadly classified as equity, income, or balanced funds. Equity funds are expected to offer high
return but at high risk since they invest in growth stocks with potential for capital appreciation but
pay low dividend. By contrast, income funds are expected to offer low returns by assuming low
risk. These funds invest in high quality bonds, money market instruments, and fixed deposits.
Balanced funds are hybrids of growth and income funds, offering moderate capital growth and
income at moderate risk.
While most funds declare their investment objectives clearly in their prospectus, it is not
evident if their realized performance is congruent with the stated objectives. For example, an equity
fund may report a low average realized return and low risk, or low average realized return at high
risk. In such situations, the funds would be regarded as having failed to deliver on their promise.
Accordingly, we seek to investigate whether CPFIS included unit trusts were able to position their
funds appropriately as stated in the prospectus. We measure unit trusts’ returns by average return
and average excess return24, while their risks are measured by betas or standard deviations of returns.
Table 3 reports the return and risk profiles of 3 types of unit trusts. Our results show that
during the 1/98 -12/07 bull market unit trust realized returns and risk were largely consistent with
their prospectus profiles. For example, equity funds for the five-year investment horizon earned the
highest average return (19.6 percent) followed by balanced funds (9.9 percent) and income funds
(2.6 percent). While the equity fund returns were the highest, their risk assumed was also
correspondingly the highest. The average standard deviation and beta of the equity funds was 13.6
percent and 0.89 respectively. These risk measures are higher than those of balanced funds (6.1
percent and 0.69) and income funds (3 percent and 0.31). The return and risk tradeoffs are also
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evident for the 10-year period, where equity funds reported the highest average return (11.2 percent)
and highest risk (standard deviation of 23.4 percent and beta of 0.86) while income funds reported
the lowest return (3.6 percent) and lowest risk (standard deviation of 2.6 percent and beta of 0.25).
The positive relationship between return and risk appears to hold even for the bear market (1/9212/01), when equity and balance funds reported higher returns than income funds but they also bear
higher risk. The only anomaly is the five-year horizon from 1/97-12/01 where equity and balanced
funds reported dismal performance due to the dotcom crash.
Table 3 here
Figure 1 provides a sample plot of the realized return and risk profiles of the full sample of
individual unit trusts for the five-year holding period. The plot shows that the risk-return profiles of
individual funds were consistent with their stated objectives: that is, the income funds generally
cluster in the lower left-hand quadrant of the graph, while equity funds cluster in the upper righthand quadrant. The average return and standard deviation of income funds are the lowest and hence
these are often deemed most suitable for risk-averse investors such as older workers or retirees.
Income funds allow these investors to protect their capital but at the cost of lower expected returns.
By contrast, equity funds earned the highest returns but at high risk, so these are often deemed
suitable for participants who can afford to take more investment risk in the hope of growing their
saving.
Figure 1 here

Risk Diversification
One of the key benefits of investing in unit trusts is that they offer investors risk diversification
which they might not otherwise be able to achieve on their own. Risk diversification occurs when
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investors spread their limited capital over a large number of stocks and financial assets. Financial
analysts often measure risk diversification by the R-square statistic of regression of excess return of
funds on the excess returns of the benchmark index.25
Panel A in Table 4 presents the R-square of equity and balanced funds for the five- and 10year holding periods. Income funds are excluded, as fund managers of such funds do not try to
track the stock market benchmark indices. Our results show that equity and balanced funds in
Singapore are relatively well diversified. The average R-square of equity funds range from 0.7 to
0.75 while those of balanced funds range from 0.64 to 0.82. This means that over 64 percent of the
variation in equity and balanced funds’ returns is explained by movements in their benchmark
indices. These results suggest that CPFIS unit trusts do help investors diversify their portfolio risk, a
benefit particularly helpful for members with meager savings.
Table 4 here

Stock Selection Skills
Another benefit of investing in a unit trust is that investors can tap the expertise of professional fund
managers to outperform the market. By relying on fund managers, CPF investors expect to earn
higher risk-adjusted return than what they could achieve themselves. Investors expect professional
fund managers to exhibit stock selection skills, that is, the ability to identify under-priced stocks for
inclusion in a portfolio. Analysts often use Jensen’s alpha26 to gauge the stock selection skill of fund
managers to earn superior returns. Fund managers with superior stock selection skills will report a
positive alpha and those with inferior skills will report a negative one.
Panel B in Table 4 reports Jensen’s alphas for equity and balanced funds for 5 and 10 year
holding periods. The average alpha earned by equity funds ranges from 0.14 to 0.4 percent. Results
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are more mixed for balanced funds, which show a positive alpha in three holding periods and
negative average alpha for the five-year holding period ending December 2007. While the average
alpha of funds is positive, we test whether the funds’ alphas are significantly different from zero at
the 5% significance level. Our results show that the majority of funds do not report significant
alphas. The percentage of equity fund managers with superior stock selection skills ranges only
from 6 to 22.5 percent for the various sub-periods. For balanced funds, the proportion is much wider,
ranging from 0 to 100 percent (the latter figure must be interpreted with care as there is only one
balanced fund with a 10-year historical series ending December 2001).
Our overall observation is that the broad majority of unit trusts managers in Singapore do
not exhibit superior stock selection skills. Accordingly, savers should not look to these fund
managers to outperform market benchmarks.

Market Timing Ability
Besides stock selection, fund managers also resort to market timing to earn superior returns. In a
bull market when stock prices are rising, a superior market timer would increase the risk exposure
of his fund so that its value would rise much faster than the overall stock market. One strategy of
achieving this is to increase the asset allocation in stocks and reduce holdings in fixed-income
securities. Conversely in a bear market, the market timer would decrease the risk exposure of his
fund so that the decline in its value would be less than the overall stock market. Under such a
market condition, the fund manager can reduce his exposure to stocks but increase his holdings of
fixed-income securities.
We follow Treynor and Mazuy (1966) to ascertain whether managers exhibit market
timing skill by using the quadratic regression in equation (1).
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Rjt - Rft = αj + βj (Rmt - Rft) + γj(Rmt - Rft)2 + εjt

(1)

A positive gamma γj indicates that the manager is able to time the market, increasing the
weighting of risky securities in a market upturn and decreasing the weighting in a market
downturn.
The results reported in Panel C of Table 9 show that the average gamma of equity and
balanced funds cluster around 0. The only exception is for balanced funds in the 5-year holding
period ending 12/07, where the average gamma was 0.97. These results generally imply that
equity fund managers do not exhibit market timing skills. Only 15 to 29 percent of equity funds
report gammas larger than 0 at the five percent significance level. Most of the balanced funds
also do not report positive gammas at the 5 percent significance level, except for the 10-year
period ending 12/07. For this holding period, half of the funds have significant positive gammas.
Accordingly, our conclusion is that fund managers generally do not exhibit market timing skills
and so investors should not rely on fund managers to time their investments to earn abnormal
returns.

Unit Trusts’ Persistence of Performance
Investors are always looking out for fund managers who are able to consistently outperform the
market. Hence, they prefer unit trusts that have a consistently good track record. To measure the
consistency of funds’ performance, we compare the rankings of unit trusts across consecutive
sample periods. We first compute Jensen’s alpha of all unit trusts over a sub-period of 30 months
and rank these funds in decreasing order based on their alphas. We repeat the process for the next,
non-overlapping 30 month sub-period to generate another ranking. We then compute the
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient27 (ρ) of these two pairs of rankings. Under the null
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hypothesis of no persistence in performance of unit trusts over time, the two sets of rankings will
be uncorrelated and ρ should be close to 0.
The Spearman rank coefficients of unit trusts are reported in Table 5. They show very low
correlation in funds’ ranking over time. In addition, these correlation coefficients are generally not
significantly different from zero which implies that the funds’ performance is not consistent across
the two sub-periods. The only exception is the results for equity funds for the period ending 12/07.
These results suggest that investors cannot rely on past performance of fund managers to predict
their future performance.
Table 5 here

Conclusion
Singapore’s pension system is coming under close scrutiny as it seeks ways to help
members accumulate sufficient savings to finance their retirement years. One way to grow
workers’ savings is to have them invest in instruments that compound at high rates of return.
Since 1986 when the CPF investment scheme was launched, the CPF Board has progressively
expanded the menu of instruments that members may elect, though for those who took the
challenge to invest themselves, the majority found it difficult to beat the CPF default interest rate
and some have even lost money. Such dismal performance led some members to turn to
professional fund managers to help them grow their savings.
We examine the performance of CPF-included unit trusts in Singapore to determine
whether these were successful in helping investors enhance their retirement saving. Our results
are mixed. On the positive side, unit trusts did provide members with substantial diversification
benefits, which is especially helpful for small investors. We also find that fund managers
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positioned their funds appropriately in terms of return-risk tradeoffs as indicated in their
prospectus. In addition, unit trusts provided average returns that were higher than the risk-free
and the CPF default interest rates. On the negative side, only a minority of these funds
outperformed their style-specific benchmarks. In particular, majority of the unit trust managers
did not exhibit stock selection or market timing skills, even though investors might expect this
from professional money managers. Our results also show that irrespective of whether they ran
equity, income, or balanced funds, most fund managers found it difficult to turn in consistent
performance over time.
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6∑ Di2
where N is the sample size and Di is the difference between the rankings of unit trust i over
ρ =1−
N ( N 2 − 1)
two different evaluation periods.

Table 1: Net Realized Profits/Losses for Investments Held Under the CPF Investment Scheme Ordinary Account (CPFIS-OA):

Members who made net realized
profits in excess of the OA interest
rate of 2.5%
% of Members
Members who made realized profits,
but equal to or less than OA rate
% of Members
Members who made realized losses
% of Members

2007

2006

2005

2004

4-year

239,000

180,000

147,000

128,000

28%

23%

19%

17%

245,000

257,000

250,000

240,000

29%

32%

33%

33%

32%

368,000
43%

362,000
45%

363,000
48%

370,000
50%

47%

22%

Note: Under the CPF Act, the Board pays a minimum interest of 2.5% per annum. The interest rate for the Ordinary Account is 2.5% as at 30 Sep 2008.
Source: Constructed from CPFIS Profits/ Losses for the Financial Year ended 31 September 2005 & 2007 www.cpf.gov.sg/cpf_info/ie/IE_reportpl.pdf (viewed
on 20 July 2008) mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/D324F161-1F6A-4699-A6BA-C5ACA0E11C5F/0/IE_reportpl.pdf (viewed on 20 July 2008)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of CPFIS-included unit trusts
Summary Statistics
Average Annual Return (%)
CPF OA (average) annual rate (%)
T-notes/bond Yield annual rate (%)
Proportion of funds with:
Average return > 0
Average return > 3-months’
T-bill rate
Average return > CPF rate
Average return > Benchmark’s return
Source: Authors’ computations

Period Ending Dec 2001

Period Ending Dec 2007

5-year

10-year

5-year

10-year

1.98
3.21
3.64

7.96
3.23
3.73

16.32
2.53
2.57

10.27
2.77
3.02

52.5%
30.0%

88.2%
82.4%

99.4%
93.6%

97.9%
85.4%

32.5%
80.0%

82.4%
88.2%

94.4%
39.5%

85.4%
64.6%

3

Table 3: Return and risk profiles of CPFIS unit trusts
Holding
Period

5 years

Average
Return (%)
Excess return (%)
Standard deviation (%)
Beta

Return (%)
Excess return (%)
10 years
Standard deviation (%)
Beta
Source: Authors’ computations

Period Ending Dec 2001
Equity
Balanced Income
2.13
-1.21
5.82
-1.48
-4.70
2.11
28.64
22.04
4.18
0.87
1.03
-0.01
8.07
4.19
22.96
0.88

9.26
5.33
25.08
0.78

Sample Period Ending Dec 2007
Equity
Balanced
Income
19.60
9.90
2.60
16.60
7.20
0.00
13.60
6.10
3.00
0.89
0.69
0.31

6.51
2.68
4.50
0

11.20
7.90
23.40
0.86

7.70
4.60
15.90
0.96

3.60
0.60
2.60
0.25

Table 4: R-square, Alphas and Gammas of CPFIS unit trusts
Holding
Period

Average

Period Ending Dec 2001
Equity
Balanced

Period Ending Dec 2007
Equity
Balanced

Panel A: R-square of regression
5 years
R-square
10 years
R-square

0.70
0.72

0.67
0.82

0.75
0.71

0.64
0.71

Panel B: Alpha of unit trusts
5 years
Average Alpha (%)
% where Alpha > 0
10 years
Average Alpha (%)
% where Alpha > 0

0.40
6.00
0.35
14.00

0.01
0.00
0.62
100

0.14
15.00
0.32
22.50

-0.02
5.00
0.07
0.00

Panel C: Gamma of unit trusts
5 years
Average Gamma (%)
% where Gamma > 0
10 years
Average Gamma (%)
% where Gamma > 0

0.00
15
0.00
29

0.01
0
0.00
0

-0.01
20
0.00
27.5

0.97
5
0.00
50

Source: Authors’ computations
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Table 5: Spearman Coefficients (ρ) of CPF-included unit trusts ranking on the Jensen alpha measure

Type of fund

Equity
Balanced
Income

Period Ending Dec 2001

Period Ending Dec 2007

ρ

# of funds

ρ

# of funds

0.17161

34

0.4634*

92

@

4

0.0281

19

@

2

0.0055

13

NA
NA

Source: Authors’ computations
* Significant at 5% level
@
Unreliable to compute statistical significance since the sample sizes are only 4 and 2 respectively for the balanced and income funds.
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Figure 1: Return and Risk Profile of Unit Trusts (5-year holding period)
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